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Part IV, "Jurisdiction and Judgments," of the Restatement (Third) of
the Foreign Relations Law of the United States is by far the longest part
and, during the lengthy consideration and formulation of the Restate-
ment, proved to be by far the most controversial. The sheer comprehen-
siveness of Part IV at least partially explains both the controversy and
the length of time consumed in its consideration. Moreover, the novelty
of the Restatement's conceptual approach to jurisdiction and the linger-
ing question as to whether the work is truly a restatement in all respects
has engendered, and will continue to raise, dispute.'
The conceptual approach to jurisdiction is troika-like. Thus, the Re-
statement suggests three jurisdictional categories: (1) jurisdiction to pre-
scribe; (2) jurisdiction to adjudicate; and (3) jurisdiction to enforce.2 The
first category is described as making a state's law applicable to persons,
things or activities;3 the second, the subjecting of particular persons or
things to a state's judicial process; 4 the third, inducing or compelling
compliance with a state's law.5
The Restatement differs fundamentally from the previous Restatement
in its conceptual approach to jurisdiction. The Second Restatement
adopted a dual approach: jurisdiction to prescribe and jurisdiction to
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1. See, e.g., Justice Scalia's recent statement on sections of Part IV:
But despite the title of the work, this must be regarded as a proposal for change rather
than a restatement of existing doctrine, since the commentary refers to not a single case,
of this or any other United States Court, that has employed the practice. The current
version of the Restatement provides no explanation for (or even acknowledgment of) this
curiosity.
United States v. Stuart, 109 S.Ct. 1183, 1196 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring).
2. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 401 (1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT (THIRD)].
3. Id. § 401(a). Application of the law can be made "by legislation, by executive act or
order, by administrative rule, or regulation or by determination of a court." Id.
4. Id. § 401(b). Judicial process includes "courts or administrative tribunals, whether in
civil or in criminal proceedings, whether or not the state is a party to the proceedings." Id.
5. Id. § 401(c). Compliance can be mandated "through the courts or by use of executive,
administrative, police or other nonjudicial action." Id.
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enforce a rule of law.6 There, prescriptive jurisdiction referred to a
state's authority under international law to make a rule of law whether
by legislation, regulation or other domestic governmental process.7 The
Third Restatement seems to assume the existence of rules of law since
nowhere does it refer to the jurisdiction of a state under international law
to exercise the law-making process. Whereas the Second Restatement
described the law-making process as jurisdiction to prescribe,8 the Third
Restatement refers to such jurisdiction as making its law applicable.9
Under the earlier analysis, applying law to persons, things or conduct
would constitute an exercise of enforcement jurisdiction.l0 Conceivably,
the Reporters of the Third Restatement view applying law to persons or
their activities as making law. Should this be the case, it seems a strained
meaning of jurisdiction to prescribe.
The Third Restatement also differs in another fundamental respect
from the earlier Restatement by adding another category of jurisdiction,
that is, jurisdiction "to adjudicate."" This category is described as a
state's subjecting "persons or things to the process of its courts or admin-
istrative tribunals .... ,,12 The third category is jurisdiction to enforce,
that is, inducing or compelling compliance or punishing noncompliance
with its laws or regulations. 13 The previous Restatement subsumed
under the jurisdiction-to-enforce category those functions referred to
under the adjudication and enforcement categories of the Third Restate-
ment.14 Indeed, the adjudicatory category is actually but a description of
a specific exercise of enforcement jurisdiction, that is, enforcing a pre-
scription through judicial or administrative processes. Whether the juris-
6. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 6'(1965) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT (SECOND)]. The Third Restatement refers to the con-
cept of jurisdiction in the Second Restatement, Le. jurisdiction to prescribe and enforce, as
being "too simple," since increasingly prescription is a function of a variety of governmental
agencies in addition to the legislature. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) pt. IV introductory note. En-
forcement jurisdiction is said to involve agencies of government other than the judicial branch.
Id. The Third Restatement gives the jurisdictional concepts of the Second Restatement a nar-
rower construction than seems warranted. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) § 6 and comment a.
Simplicity of analysis may be a virtue rather than a fault respecting a subject as ambiguous as
"jurisdiction."
7. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) § 6.
8. Id.
9. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 401(a).
10. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) § 6 comment a. The application of the laws prescribed is
carried out by either the judicial or executive branch, in the case of the United States. Id.
11. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 401(b).
12. Id.
13. Id. § 401(c).
14. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) § 6 comment a states: "Examples of the exercise of jurisdic-
tion to enforce are arrest, a criminal or civil trial, the entry of a judgment by a court, and the
confiscation of contraband by customs officers."
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diction-troika adds clarity or confusion to analysis must be for the reader
or user of the Third Restatement to decide.
The treatment of bases of a state's jurisdiction to prescribe in the Third
Restatement is traditional with one major exception: "conduct outside its
territory that has or is intended to have substantial effect within its terri-
tory." 15 This formulation is much broader than that of the Second Re-
statement, and most importantly appears to exceed judicial formulations
of either U.S. or foreign courts. 16 The previous Restatement took the
position that there must be an effect within the territory of the prescrib-
ing state. 17 A careful reading of section 402(1)(c) leads to the conclusion
that a "no-effects" basis has been added to the "effects" basis of prescrip-
tive jurisdiction. This conclusion results from the uncoupling of "has"
and "is intended" by the disjunctive "or." Thus, an intended "effect"
without a realized effect is said to authorize a state "to make its law
applicable to the" activity abroad of the person having such an intent.
Jurisdiction to prescribe based upon intent alone is said to be rare; 18 ref-
erence is made to reporters' note 8 of section 403, where presumably
support is to be found. The cases referred to there, however, do not ap-
pear generally to support a mere "intent" basis of jurisdiction. 19
15. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 402(l)(c) (emphasis added).
16. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) § 18; infra note 27 and accompanying text.
17. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) § 18. When there is conduct outside the territory of a state,
the state can prescribe rules of law regulating such conduct only when there is an effect within
the territory of the prescribing state. Id. at § 18 comment a. If the conduct was by a national
of the state, there is no need for an effect in the territory since there is another basis of jurisdic-
tion to prescribe. Id. In this latter aspect, the Second and Third Restatements are in agree-
ment. Compare id. § 30 and RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 402(2).
18. Subject to § 403, the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 402 comment d states:
When the intent to commit the proscribed act is clear and demonstrated by some activity,
and the effect to be produced by the activity is substantial and foreseeable, the fact that
the plan or conspiracy was thwarted does not deprive the target state of jurisdiction to
make its law applicable.
19. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 403 reporters' note 8. Captioned "Criminal and civil
jurisdiction," this note fails to deal with intent without actual effect within the territory of the
prescribing state. The cases referred to in that note, with one exception, which is discussed
below, do not involve factual patterns of extraterritorial intent without actual effect. For ex-
ample, Rivard v. United States, 375 F.2d 882 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 884 (1967),
involved conduct both within and outside the United States in that the conspirators smuggled
narcotics into the United States while operating in Canada, the United States and other coun-
tries. Id. at 884. The court found "that the conspiracy was carried on partly in and partly out
of this country; and that the overt acts were committed within the United States by co-conspir-
ators." Id. at 886. Rocha v. United States, 288 F.2d 545 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 948
(1961), and United States v. Pizzarusso, 388 F.2d 8 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 936 (1968),
both cited in the reporters' note, did not involve exercises of prescriptive jurisdiction; they
were cases of fraudulent attempts to gain immigrant or resident alien status in the United
States. See Rocha, 288 F.2d at 546; Pizzarusso, 388 F.2d at 9. United States v. King, 552 F.2d
833 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 966 (1977), was also a case of conspiracy to intro-
duce narcotics into the United States. The court referred to the U.S. citizenship of the defend-
ants as a basis of jurisdiction. Id. at 851. The facts also reflect that heroin was distributed in
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At a minimum, section 402(l)(c) should have made clear that the in-
tent basis can at most exist only in criminal conspiracies where the pur-
pose of a statutory prescription is clear, and that even in such cases
support for such a prescriptive jurisdictional base is minimal. It should
also have pointed out that there is no foreign support for such a basis,
and that an exercise of such prescriptive jurisdiction by a state followed
by its enforcement may well result in a violation of international law.
Interestingly, section 415, "Jurisdiction to Regulate Anti-Competitive
Activities," leaves open the question of whether intent without actual
effect provides a sufficient basis to prescribe regulations that apply to
anti-competitive conduct abroad. 20 Since restrictive business activity
abroad with intent or foreseeability to cause effect followed by actual and
substantial effect within the United States gave birth to the "effects" doc-
trine of prescriptive jurisdiction in the United States, it seems anomalous
to caveat the question of whether intent alone is sufficient in such cases.
21
Since publication of the Third Restatement, the U.S. Department of
Justice has issued its new Antitrust Enforcement Guidelines for Interna-
tional Operations.22 These guidelines provide that U.S. antitrust laws are
not applicable to conduct or transactions taking place outside of the
United States unless those activities have a "direct, substantial, and rea-
sonably foreseeable effect on U.S. interstate commerce, on import trade
the United States. Id. at 852. United States v. Wright-Barker, 784 F.2d 161 (3d Cir. 1986),
also involving a conspiracy by at least eight persons to introduce narcotics into the United
States from a vessel on the high seas, some 200 miles off the New Jersey coast, interpreted a
U.S. criminal statute as applying extraterritorially where 23 tons of marijuana were found
secreted in the vessel's hold. Id. at 166-67. In its opinion, the court found support in an
earlier draft of § 402 of Third Restatement, see RESTATEMENT OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS
LAW OF THE UNITED STATES (REVISED) § 402 (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1985), which included the
"intent" basis. Id. at 168. The Third Restatement finding support for its intent-with-no-effects
basis in Wright-Barker is simply mutual bootstrapping. See also United States v. Stuart, 109
S.Ct. 1183, 1197 n.* (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring):
The court relied in part upon testimony-reproduced in The ABM Treaty Interpretation
Resolution of the Committee on Foreign Relations United States Senate, S. Rep. No. 100-
164 p. 49 (1987)-by none other than the reporter for the Restatement of the Foreign
Relations Law, Professor Louis Henkin. Thus, by self-exertion, so to speak, there is now
at least one case that the Restatement almost restates.
20. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 415 comment d: "[T]his Restatement takes no position
on the question whether intended or threatened effect (without actual &ffect) on the commerce
of the United States satisfies the requirement of effect under Subsection (2)" of § 415.
21. See United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945). In this
often-cited case, Judge Learned Hand stated that "it is settled law ... that any state may
impose liabilities, even upon persons not within its allegiance, for conduct outside its borders
that has consequences within its borders which the state reprehends; and these liabilities other
states will ordinarily recognize." Id. at 443 (citations omitted).
22. U.S. Dep't of Justice, Antitrust Enforcement Guidelines for International Operations,
reprinted in 24 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 1 (Nov. 10, 1988) [hereinafter Antitrust Guidelines].
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or commerce or on the export trade or commerce of a person engaged in
trade or commerce in the United States."
23
An indication of the European view of extraterritorial jurisdiction to
prescribe is found in the European Court of Justice's recent judgment in
the so-called "Wood Pulp case."'24 The court held that for extraterrito-
rial application of the Rome Treaty's prescriptions on competition, prin-
cipally article 85, there must be "conduct made up of two elements, the
formation of the agreement, decision or concerted practice and the im-
plementation thereof .... The producers in this case implemented their
pricing agreement within the Common Market. '2 5 Thus the conduct
abroad was coupled with "implementation" in the territory.
Support for section 402(l)(c) appears limited to United States v.
Wright-Barker26 and is dubious itself in the circumstances of that case.
Surely, this paucity of support is insufficient to provide a foundation for
such a controversial provision.
27
A somewhat similar desire to move the law in the direction the Re-
porters apparently prefer underlies section 403 as well. Desirable as its
concepts may be, it seems implausible that section 403 rises to the level of
having been "established in U.S. law" and having "emerged as a princi-
ple of international law," as is stated in comment a to that section.
2 8
The Second Restatement approached the issue of conflicting prescrip-
tions as a matter of moderating the exercise of the jurisdiction to en-
force.29 The approach of the Third Restatement is that a state may not
exercise jurisdiction to prescribe even if a section 402 basis is present if
the prescription would be "unreasonable" in the light of all "relevant"
factors.30 The differing conceptual approach to categories of jurisdiction,
23. Id. at 87-88. The policy is not aimed at "anticompetitive conduct that has no effect, or
only a remote effect, on U.S. consumer welfare." Id. at 1.
24. See A. AhIstrom Osakeytio v. EC Commission, Case No. 89/85 (Ct. of Just. of the
Eur. Communities, Sept. 27, 1988).
25. Id. at 14-15.
26. 784 F.2d 161 (3rd Cir. 1986).
27. The implications of this novel intent-without-effects basis of prescriptive jurisdiction
can be demonstrated by a hypothetical set of facts involving individual action. A farmer in
State X cultivates a crop of marijuana with the intent of harvesting the crop for export to the
United States. Prior to harvest, the crop is destroyed by a flood and no marijuana is exported
to the United States by the farmer. Although § 402(l)(c) would purport to provide a basis of
prescriptive jurisdiction over that farmer, it seems extremely doubtful that a U.S. or any other
court would agree, or that the Department of Justice would initiate enforcement proceedings.
See Antitrust Guidelines, supra note 22.
28. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 403 comment a. In fact, the D.C. Circuit rejected the
interest balancing approach adopted by the Third Restatement in Laker Airways v. Sabena,
Belgian World Airways, 731 F.2d 909, 948 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
29. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) § 40.




discussed above, 31 explains in part why the two restatements differ on the
rationale for whether the moderation of conflicts- is a matter of prescrip-
tive or enforcement jurisdiction. While this difference is not highly sig-
nificant here, the earlier Restatement did not state that the principles for
moderation of conflicting commands were law of the United States or of
international law. Rather it restated the principle that in a case of con-
flicting prescriptions "each state is required by international law to con-
sider, in good faith, moderating the exercise of its enforcement
jurisdiction, in the light of" a non-exclusive list of enumerated factors.
32
Since publication of the Second Restatement, its approach to conflicting
exercise of jurisdiction has been reflected in decisions by courts in the
United States.
33
Significantly, the Justice Department's Antitrust Guidelines, in discuss-
ing factors affecting the Department's discretion in deciding whether to
assert jurisdiction in antitrust enforcement cases, do not refer to either
section 40 of the earlier Restatement or section 403 of this new Restate-
ment.3 4 While comity is a consideration, the view is that antitrust suits
prosecuted by the U.S. government should not be dismissed by U.S.
courts on the basis of comity since the government weighs such matters
prior to initiating the action.
35
Following presentation of the conceptual framework of jurisdiction to
prescribe, the Third Restatement presents a number of illustrations of the
application of the principles set out in that framework.36 All of those
illustrations are not reviewed here; rather sections 415 and 416 are
treated briefly and section 414 is analyzed in more detail. The introduc-
tory note to subchapter B of Chapter IV calls attention to the contro-
versy surrounding section 414, "Jurisdiction with Respect to Activities of
Foreign Branches and Subsidiaries."' 37 Nonetheless, that section is in-
cluded in subchapter B which is said to deal with applications by states
31. See supra notes 1-14 and accompanying text.
32. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) § 40.
33. See, e.g., Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, 549 F.2d 597, 613 n.27 (9th
Cir. 1976) (" 'jurisdictional' forbearance in the international setting is more a question of com-
ity and fairness than one of national power"); Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp.,
595 F.2d 1287, 1296 (3rd Cir. 1979) (various factors bear on whether to exercise jurisdiction.)
34. See Antitrust Guidelines, supra note 22.
35. Id. at 93 n.167.
36. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) §§ 411-416. Sections 411-414 are concerned with the ap-
plication of the principles of sections 402 and 403 by states in general to the specific areas of
taxation and to foreign branches and subsidiaries. See id. pt. IV, subchapter B introductory
note. Section 415, "Jurisdiction to Regulate Anti-Competitive Activities," and section 416,
"Jurisdiction to Regulate Activities Related to Securities" detail the Restatement's view of the
United States' exercise of its jurisdiction to prescribe in these areas. See id. pt. IV subchapter
C introductory note.
37. Id. pt. IV, subchapter B, introductory note.
473
Yale Journal of International Law
generally;38 presumably section 414 is put forward as a restatement of
principles of international law.
Section 414 of the Restatement addresses situations in which a state
exercises its jurisdiction to prescribe over a corporate national entity
which owns a branch in another state or owns or controls a subsidiary
incorporated in another state. Under international law, a corporation
has the nationality of the state in which it is incorporated, and that na-
tionality is an acceptable basis for a state to exercise jurisdiction to pre-
scribe with respect to such a corporation. 39 Recognizing that there are
situations in which two states may prescribe conflicting laws and regula-
tions governing different elements of a corporate group, the Third Re-
statement advances proposals to resolve such conflicts.
40
The Restatement's general rule is that "[a] state may not ordinarily
regulate activities of corporations organized under the laws of a foreign
state on the basis that they are owned or controlled by nationals of the
regulating state.' 41 However, this general principle may not be applied
under certain circumstances. 42 Hence, a subsidiary or other affiliate of a
multinational corporation may be subjected to conflicting prescriptions if
both the state of the parent and the state of the subsidiary claim a basis of
jurisdiction.43 The Restatement proposes a solution in which each such
state must "evaluate its own as well as the other state's interest in exer-
cising jurisdiction," and "a state should defer to the other state if that
state's interest is clearly greater."44
An inherent problem in conducting the balancing of factors as ad-
vanced in sections 414(2) and 403 is that the balance will normally have
to be struck by a court.45 Although the approach has apparent appeal as
38. See id.
39. Cf Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421, 436-37 (1932) (U.S. jurisdiction over
natural persons who are U.S. citizens not disputed in international law).
40. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 414(2). This section incorporates by reference sections
403 and 441. More particularly, section 403(3) provides a framework for resolving conflicts
when two states have concurrent jurisdiction.
41. Id. § 414(2).
42. Id. §§ 414(2)(a), 414(2)(b)(i)-414(2)(b)(iii).
43. Id.
44. Id. § 403(3).
45. See Laker Airways v. Sabena, Belgian World Airways, 731 F.2d 909 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
In Laker, the plaintiff filed an antitrust suit in the United States against various domestic,
British and other foreign airlines. Id. at 915. Thereafter, the British defendants obtained in-
junctions in England restraining the plaintiff from proceeding with its suit against them in the
United States. The plaintiff then obtained an injunction in the United States restraining the
remaining defendants from getting an injunction similar to the one obtained by the British
defendants. Both courts issued the injunctions in order to effect their respective legislative
mandates. Id. at 945-46. The D.C. Circuit found that both the United States and England had




a theoretical means of dealing with difficult conflicts arising from the
nature of multinational corporate participation in a global economy, in
practice the approach presents serious problems. 46
First, U.S. courts are faced with deciding two threshold issues: is there
jurisdiction for the prescription and is there jurisdiction to enforce it in
the context of the case.47 Whether the prescription involved is based
upon sound policy considerations and whether the enforcement would
implicate political interests of other states are usually not questions for
judicial determination. 48 Legislatures, or in some cases the executive,
usually consider such issues in prescribing the law or regulation. A court
is particularly ill-equipped to weigh the interests of another state.49
Assuming that the weighing process is carried out by a court, it must
then determine if one state's interest is "clearly greater."' 50 , The enforcing
state's court can hardly be neutral in making such a determination.51 The
practice of U.S. courts demonstrates that as long as the interests of the
United States are more than de minimis, U.S. courts will not defer to
other states.52 The burden that this process would impose on U.S. courts
is one that they are not equipped to carry.5 3
In light of the serious objections many foreign states have made to U.S.
prescriptions respecting subsidiaries of U.S. companies incorporated
under their laws and doing business there,5 4 it seems highly doubtful that
section 414 should have been included in subchapter B of Chapter 1 of
Part IV which is said to include applications "by states generally." 5 5 If
included at all, it should have been positioned in subchapter C, since that
subchapter deals with "United States Applications." If the United States
is to apply its prescriptions to foreign affiliates of U.S. companies, it is
preferable that it do so by requiring the parent to order its foreign affiliate
scriptions of two states are in direct conflict, the resolution often falls to the judiciary. Id. at
952 n.169.
46. See id. at 948. The balancing of interests of two states is practical for choosing a
particular forum over another but "their usefulness breaks down when a court is faced with
the task of selecting one forum's prescriptive jurisdiction over that of another."
47. See id. at 945-46 (court must determine through statutory interpretation and judicial
precedent if its state should exercise jurisdiction).
48. See id. at 949 ("court cannot refuse to enforce a Jaw its political branches have already
determined is desirable and necessary.").
49. Id. at 950.
50. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 403(3).
51. See Laker, 731 F.2d at 951.
52. Id. at 950-51.
53. Id. at 949.
54. For example, in Laker, the court noted that the provisions of the British Protection of
Trading Interest Act, 1980 were designed to frustrate the extraterritorial reach of U.S. anti-
trust laws. Id. at 945-47.
55. See supra text accompanying notes 37-38.
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to follow the prescribed course of conduct. While such an application
will not eliminate controversy, it could serve as a mitigating factor.
Section 415, "Jurisdiction to Regulate Anti-Competitive Activities,"
discussed above with respect to jurisdiction to prescribe based on "in-
tent" without any effect in the United States or on U.S. commerce, 56
provides in comment d that courts "have divided as to whether intent to
interfere with the commerce of the United States without an actual anti-
competitive effect on that commerce will support an exercise of jurisdic-
tion under the antitrust law."' 57 The reader is referred to reporters' notes
3 and 4 where presumably divided authority on the issue is to be found.
However, neither of these notes includes any support for the "intent-
without-effect" basis of jurisdiction.5 8 As is abundantly clear from the
recent Department of Justice Antitrust Enforcement Guidelines for Inter-
national Operations, an actual effect is a requirement for U.S. enforce-
ment.59 Whether the intent basis is good policy is not the determinant
for a restatement provision. If a proposed principle has not been ac-
cepted as law, it has no place in a restatement.
Section 416, "Jurisdiction to Regulate Activities Related to Securi-
ties," includes a specific application of the "intent-but-no-effects" basis of
jurisdiction included in section 402(1)(c). 60 Sections 416(l)(b)(i), (ii) and
(c) provide that the United States has jurisdiction to prescribe with re-
spect to securities transactions based upon intent without more.61 Com-
ment a states: "Under this section, the United States may exercise
jurisdiction to prohibit and punish not only acts that have resulted in
harmful effects in the United States, but also attempts or conspiracies
even if thwarted before they are realized." 62 These provisions suffer from
similar lack of authority as has been discussed earlier.63 It is obvious
that an "intent" can be that of a single individual where no conspiracy is
56. See supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text.
57. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 415 comment d.
58. See supra note 15.
59. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
60. See supra notes 15-19 and accompanying text.
61. Section 416(1) states in pertinent part:
(1) The United States may generally exercise jurisdiction to prescribe with respect to...
(b) any transaction in securities
(i) carried out, or intended to be carried out, on an organized securities market in
the United States, or
(ii) carried out. or intended to be carried out, predominantly in the United States,
although not on an organized securities market;
(c) conduct, regardless of where it occurs, significantly related to a transaction described
in Subsection (1)(b), if the conduct was, or is intended to have, a substantial effect in
the United States ....
62. Id. § 416 comment a.




present. The intent basis specified in section 402 causes difficulties
throughout the sections dealing with specific applications. 64
Chapter 2, "Jurisdiction to Adjudicate," as discussed earlier, is often
viewed as enforcement jurisdiction since some prescription-valid under
international law-is to be applied or enforced with respect to a person,
thing or conduct. 65 The enforcing function of a court in the particular
case may also result in the articulation of a prescription. This result is
not unusual in common law systems of jurisprudence. 66
While delineating judicial adjudication as a special category of juris-
diction, as is done in Chapter 2,67 may not be of great significance, it is
somewhat confusing to find that judicial adjudication is also categorized
as jurisdiction to enforce.68 The Restatement states that jurisdiction to
enforce through the courts is dependent upon the court's having jurisdic-
tion to adjudicate. 69 Thus, judicial enforcement is dependent upon two
conditions: jurisdiction to prescribe and jurisdiction to adjudicate. This
three step analysis adds one unnecessary step-jurisdiction to adjudi-
cate-particularly since adjudicatory jurisdiction and judicial enforce-
ment often occur in the same proceeding.
It is interesting to note that jurisdiction to adjudicate with respect to
conduct outside the state requires an actual effect within the state.70 This
is in marked contrast to section 402(l)(c) which provides jurisdiction to
prescribe based upon the theory of "intent-but-no-effect" basis.71 This
combination appears to lead to the anomalous result that even though a
state has jurisdiction to prescribe, it would lack jurisdiction to adjudicate
if intent but no actual effect had occurred.
Chapter 3, "Jurisdiction to Enforce," introduces novel concepts as to
enforcement measures requiring jurisdiction to prescribe as a condition
to a state's taking enforcement action.72 Illustrations in comment c in-
64. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 415.
65. See supra notes 8 and 9 and accompanying text.
66. See M. EISENBERG, THE NATURE OF THE COMMON LAW (1988) ("The common law
... is that part of the law that is within the province of the courts themselves to establish.").
67. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), pt. IV, ch. 2, introductory note..
68. See id. § 431(3)(c): "A state may employ enforcement measures against a person lo-
cated outside its territory... when enforcement is through the courts, if the state has jurisdic-
tion to adjudicate."
69. Id.
70. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 421(2)0). Section 421(2) lists various situations in
which a state's jurisdiction to adjudicate would be reasonable including when "the person,
whether natural or juridical, had carried on outside the state an activity having a substantial,
direct and foreseeable effect within the state .... "
71. See supra notes 15-19 and accompanying text.
72. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 431(1). This section states that "[a] state may employ
judicial or nonjudicial measures to induce or compel compliance or punish non-compliance
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elude the "denial of the right to engage in export or import transactions"
and the "removal from a list of persons eligible to bid on government
contracts. ' 73 In the absence of an international agreement providing
such rights for nationals of a foreign country, it is inconceivable that the
U.S. government would have to demonstrate jurisdiction to prescribe in
order to deny trade and bidding participation to foreign persons. Neither
would the government need to have jurisdiction to prescribe in order to
place a non-resident alien on a U.S. export blacklist. While an enforcing
state does restrain itself in the circumstances described in comment c,
such restraint derives from the threat of retaliatory treatment by other
states for arbitrary action rather than from restraint premised on an ab-
sence of jurisdiction to prescribe. 74 The flaw in the concept of jurisdic-
tion to enforce lies in the effort to subsume too many illustrations of
discretionary governmental action under such a principle. Although it is
not suggested here that a state act arbitrarily with respect to the illustra-
tions referred to in comment c, there is no international law restraint
upon such action as to aliens with the possible exception of blocking the
transfer of an alien's assets located in the United States.75 Indeed, com-
ment e(iv), "[c]onditions of exigency," inferentially admits that a state
may act without reference to jurisdiction to prescribe.76 In comment f,
reference is made to denial of a visa because of a fraudulent application
as presumably an exercise of jurisdiction to enforce. Surely, this denial is
not the kind of government action requiring a showing of jurisdiction to
prescribe since the alien applying for a visa to enter the United States has
no right to it which is protected by a reasonableness concept, In the
absence of an international agreement, a state may determine its own
standards or criteria for entry of aliens. Again, too much is sought to be
packaged in the jurisdictional bag.
Chapter 4, "Jurisdiction and the Law of Other States," is made up of
two subchapters: Subchapter A, "Foreign State Compulsion," 77 and
with its laws or regulations, provided it has jurisdiction to prescribe in accordance with §§ 402
and 403."
73. See id § 431 comment c.
74. Id. For example, in 1982, the United States prohibited the supplying of equipment and
technology for use in the Soviet gas pipeline to Western Europe by various foreign entities,
some of which were affiliates of U.S. companies. Because of the international dispute as to
jurisdiction created by the prohibitions, the controls were lifted. See DeSouza, The Soviet Gas
Pipeline Incident: Extension of Collective Security Responsibilities to Peacetime Commercial
Trade, 10 YALE J. INT'L L. 92 (1984).
75. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 431 reporters' note 4.
76. Id. § 431 comment e states: "In situations requiring urgent action, enforcement meas-
ures may be implemented prior to opportunity to be heard, and in exceptional circumstances
even without prior notice."




Subchapter B, "The Act of State Doctrine. ' 78 Section 441, "Foreign
State Compulsion," is set forth as a prescription of international law. It
may, however, prove difficult to find practice and jurisprudence of for-
eign countries treating the doctrine since it is usually invoked only by a
defendant in a U.S. enforcement action arising out of a U.S. prescription
asserted to have extraterritorial effect conflicting with a prescription of
the foreign territorial state. Section 441 restates the doctrine except that
it prefaces both subsections with the words "in general."'79 Such a pre-
face introduces an element of uncertainty regarding the effectiveness of
the doctrine as a defense in the United States.
Comment a implicates section 403(3) in that it provides for recognition
of the defense in cases in which the territorial state asserts an exercise of
its prescription and enforcement jurisdiction "over any person, including
a foreign national," if the exercise would be unreasonable under that sec-
tion.80 This -reference to section 403 is fraught with the problems and
vagaries discussed earlier in determining whether a state should generally
exercise jurisdiction. 81
Cases in which the foreign sovereign compulsion defense would likely
be raised are those involving governmental enforcement proceedings.8 2
The new Justice Department Antitrust Enforcement Guidelines recognize
foreign sovereign compulsion as a defense83 thereby giving that doctrine
much greater status than had been the case earlier.84 The "denial of spe-
cific substantial benefits" is now included as a basis for the defense.85 On
78. Id. §§ 443, 444.
79. Id. 441
80. Id. § 441 comment a.
81. See supra notes 28-35 and accompanying text.
82. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 441 comment a.
83. See Antitrust Guidelines, supra note 22, at 95. "Where the private anticompetitive
conduct is actually compelled by the foreign sovereign, the defense of foreign sovereign com-
pulsion may prevent challenge under the U.S. antitrust laws." The United States filed a brief
as amicus curiae in Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio, 471 U.S. 1348 (1986), argu-
ing that the alleged anticompetitive conduct by certain Japanese companies (the defendants)
was compelled by the Japanese Government. The Supreme Court did not reach the sovereign
compulsion defense.
84. See Antitrust Guidelines, supra note 22, at 97-102. A sensible approach to the antitrust
laws supports the implication that foreign state compulsion is a valid defense. To carry out the
legislative intent of Congress, the U.S. Department of Justice will not conduct antitrust en-
forcement actions if certain conditions are met. First, the anticompetitive act must have been
compelled by a foreign state and "a refusal to comply ... would give rise to the imposition of
significant penalties or to the denial of specific substantial benefits." Id. at 98-99. Second, the
foreign compulsion defense will not be recognized if the activity, even if compelled by a foreign
state, "has occurred wholly or primarily in the United States." Id. at 99.
85. Id. The Restatement in comment c states that exposure to a severe sanction, either
criminal or civil, is normally required for foreign-sovereign compulsion to be a valid defense.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 441 comment c. The "denial of opportunity for new [business]
arrangements would probably" not be sufficient.
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the other hand, foreign government encouragement will not provide a
basis for the defense, although the guidelines suggest that it may be con-
sidered in a comity analysis in deciding whether to exercise enforcement
jurisdiction. 86 These Guidelines greatly reinforce the usefulness of the
defense and should result in a strengthened reading of section 441; the
words "[i]n general" should be read out of the black letter law.
Section 442 of the Restatement deals with disclosure of information
located in foreign states by persons subject to the (presumably enforce-
ment) jurisdiction of the United States. 87 One disturbing aspect of this
section is that adverse findings of fact may be made against "a party that
has failed to comply with the order for production, even if that party has
made a good faith effort to secure permission from the foreign authorities
to make the information available and that effort has been unsuccess-
ful."' 88 In comment f, the Restatement states that this is not a penalty but
rather it is a means to induce compliance.8 9
An adverse finding of fact for noncompliance goes beyond U.S. law.
In Socidtd Internationale v. Rogers90 (the "Interhandel Case") the
Supreme Court, in reversing a dismissal of the plaintiff's suit for noncom-
pliance with an order to produce certain documents located in Switzer-
land because of that country's bank secrecy laws, stated that despite the
party's good faith effort to comply with the order, the district court on
remand "may... be justified in drawing inferences unfavorable" to the
plaintiff.91 The difference between an adverse finding of fact and an ad-
verse inference is substantial; the former is conclusive as "to the facts
found while the latter is subject to rebuttal.
The discussion in the reporters' notes to this section fails to provide
support for the black letter "adverse finding of fact" position. In the
reporters' discussion of Socidtd Internationale, it is stated that some
courts "have applied the [Supreme] Court's suggestion that inferences
unfavorable to the nonproducing party may be drawn even if that party
86. See Antitrust Guidelines, supra note 22, at 99.
87. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 442(I)(a). Disclosure may be ordered by "[a] court or
agency in the United States, when authorized by statute or rule of court .... " Comment a of
this section also states that disclosure can result from a demand of a party.
88. Id. § 442(2)(c).
89. Id. § 442 comment f. The adverse finding should only be made when it is believed
"that the information, if disclosed, would support a finding adverse to the noncomplying party
and if ... the request was made in good faith, not simply as a way of obtaining the adverse
finding." Id.
90. 357 U.S. 197 (1958). The International Court of Justice refused to hear the case on the
ground that the exhaustion of local remedies applied during the pendency of local proceedings.
Interhandel Case (Switz. v. U.S.), 1957 I.C.J. 105 (Order of Oct. 24, 1957).




is not at fault . ,,92 Whether this is a matter of semantics is left to the
reader to decide. What is clear is that the Court made no reference to
"findings of fact."
Blocking statutes prohibiting the disclosure or removal of documents
from the territory of the state, usually upon pain of severe sanction, have
become increasingly prevalent in recent years.93 It would be unjust in-
deed to make an adverse finding of fact against a party prevented from
compliance with a disclosure order by such a statute. An adverse finding
of fact in these circumstances would amount to a "penalty" and not a
"means" to force compliance since compliance would be impossible.
The formulation of section 443, "The Act of State Doctrine: Law of
the United States" accurately reflects the often-quoted passage of Justice
Harlan in Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino.94 The commentary to
that section, however, fails to make clear what courts in subsequent cases
have concluded are exceptions to the act of state doctrine. The phrasing
of this passage strongly supports the position that exceptions to the doc-
trine were carved out by Justice Harlan. Thus, cases in which the prop-
erty was outside the territory of the taking state, or takings by
unrecognized governments, or where agreements were unambiguous in
expressing controlling legal principles were intended to be excepted from
application of the doctrine.
Although comment b to section 443 discusses cases since Sabbatino, it
treats them in a questioning manner as though they have not established
U.S. foreign relations law. That treatment draws down an iron curtain
on the doctrine after Sabbatino. Two apparently non-controversial ex-
ceptions, the non-territorial exception 95 and the international agreement
exception, 96 should have been elevated to the status of black letter law.
92. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 442 reporters' note 6. Subsequent cases cited by the report-
ers' notes only indicate one case in which an adverse finding for noncompliance with disclosure
was made but this was in the context of determining whether the court had jurisdiction over
the party. See id. § 442 reporters' note 11.
93. See generally A. LOWE, EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION xviii (1983)_
94. 376 U.S. 398 (1964). In the opinion, Justice Harlan stated:
[R]ather than laying down or reaffirming an inflexible and all-encompassing rule in this
case, we decide only that the Judicial Branch will not examine the validity of a taking of
property within its own territory by a foreign sovereign government, extant and recog-
nized by this country at the time of suit, in the absence of a treaty or other unambiguous
agreement regarding controlling legal principles, even if the complaint alleges that the
taking violates customary international law.
Id. at 428.
95. See, e.g., Republic of Iraq v. First National City Bank, 241 F. Supp. 567 (S.D.N.Y.),
affid, 353 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1027 (1966).
96. See Kalamazoo Spice Extraction Co. v. Provisional Military Government of Socialist
Ethiopia, 729 F.2d 422 (6th Cir. 1984) (language of Sabbatino postulates a treaty exception to
the act of state doctrine).
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This could have been-made clear by adding a section or sections as was
done with section 444-the Statutory Limitation. It may be that the
draftsman sought to compress too many propositions into too concise a
statement. However, the complexity of the act of state doctrine deserves
a fuller restatement.
While the Supreme Court is the final authority in the U.S. legal sys-
tem, it does not follow that it must, or indeed can, rule on every legal
issue, including those in which the act of state doctrine is involved, to
determine U.S. law on matters differing in their facts and circumstances
from an earlier Supreme Court decision. The reluctance of the Restate-
ment to give authoritative weight to lower court decisions stands in
marked contrast to its use of lower court decisions in other sections. 97
The Restatement is more conclusive in carving out an exception for
human rights violations.98 Although from a policy perspective there may
be no objection to prescribing an exception to the act of state doctrine for
human rights violations, legal authority is lacking for support of such an
exception as foreign relations law of the United States. If the rationale
for the doctrine, at least in part, remains to avoid embarrassment in U.S.
foreign relations by not examining the validity or propriety of foreign
governmental conduct, alleged human rights violations would seem to
provoke greater sensitivity than allegations of economic deprivation by a
government. 99 The case of Filartiga v. Pena-Irala10o (which involved se-
97. For example, section 456 on waivers of immunity, provides in subsection (2)(b) that an
agreement of a state to arbitrate constitutes a waiver of immunity in actions both to compel
arbitration and to enforce an award. Although no Supreme Court decision exists supporting
that principle, nonetheless, the black letter provision is based upon lower federal court deci-
sions. See cases cited in id. reporters' note 3. See also id. § 402(l)(c), where the Restatement
provides that a state has prescriptive jurisdiction based upon conduct outside its territory that
is intended to have substantial effect within its territory but where no effect results. See supra
notes 15-19 and accompanying text. Similarly, section 433(2) modifies the Supreme Court
decision in Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436 (1886), by stating that forcible apprehension of a
person in a foreign country who is brought into the United States may prevent prosecution in
the United States if the "apprehension or delivery was carried out in such reprehensible man-
ner as to shock the conscience of civilized society." This exception was not recognized in the
Ker case where the Court clearly left undecided any such limitation on prosecution in the
circumstances of that case. See also Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519 (1952), a case of alleged
interstate abduction later followed by prosecution where the Court affirmed the rule of Ker.
The Restatement bases the exception of subsection (2) on a lower court decision, United States
v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267, reh'g denied, 504 F.2d. 1380 (2d Cir. 1974). RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) § 433 reporters' note 3.
98. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 443 comment c.
99. The relationship between economic and human rights violations can be illustrated by
the following hypothetical situation. A foreign state incarcerates an alien in violation of inter-
national law, torturing him and stealing his valuable gold watch. The Restatement's formula-
tion would preclude the use of the act of state doctrine as a defense in an action for the torture
as a violation of human rights, but would allow its use to dismiss an action to recover the gold
watch or its value after it entered the United States.
100. 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
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vere human rights deprivation and which is discussed in reporters' note
3) is properly described as not involving an act of state since the acts of
torture were not ratified by the foreign government.101 No authority for
a human rights exception is advanced in either the commentary or the
reporters' notes.
Controversy has arisen over whether there is an exception to the act of
state doctrine for the commercial acts of foreign states. 102 The Restate-
ment takes the position that such an exception has not been decided.
10 3
The ambiguity of the Dunhill104 decision could suggest such a conclu-
sion. Since the decision in that case, lower federal courts have demon-
strated considerable confusion as to whether a "commercial act"
exception has been established.105
A rational policy analysis of the interplay of the restrictive doctrine of
sovereign immunity as expressed by Congress in the commercial act ex-
ceptions of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA)10 6 and the act
of state doctrine strongly supports the view that Congress did not intend
that claims against a foreign state arising out of commercial acts be de-
nied judicial consideration on their merits. The House Report made it
clear that it did not intend that foreign state's commercial acts be ele-
vated "to the protected status of 'acts of states'" thus "permitting sover-
eign immunity to reenter through the back door, under the guise of the
act of state doctrine."' 0 7
101. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 443 reporters' note 3.
102. See id., § 443 comment c and reporters' notes 2, 3 and 6.
103. Id. § 443 comment c.
104. Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682 (1976). The policy
rationale for the act of state doctrine was the subject of sharp debate among the justices.
105. See, e.g., Environmental Tectonics v. W. S. Kirkpatrick, Inc., 847 F.2d 1052 (3d Cir.
1988) (court discussed whether commercial exception existed but denied application of act of
state doctrine on other grounds); Sage Int'l, Ltd. v. Cadillac Gage Co., 534 F.Supp. 896 (E.D.
Mich. 1981) (in denying application of act of state doctrine, court drew upon the definition of
commercial activity in the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act and the intent of Congress that
such activity not be shielded from decision on the merits).
106. Pub L. No. 94-583, 90 Stat. 2891 (1976) (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1332
(a)(2)(3)(4), 1391(f), 1441(d), 1602-1611(1982)) [hereinafter FSIA].
107. See HOUSE REPORT ON THE FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITIES ACT, H.R. Rep. 94-
1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 20 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE & ADMIN. NEWS 6604,
6619 n.1 [hereinafter HOUSE REPORT], which provides:
The committee has found it unnecessary to address the act of state doctrine in this legisla-
tion since decisions such as that in the Dunhill case demonstrate that our courts already
have considerable guidance enabling them to reject improper assertions of the act of state
doctrine. For example, it appears that the doctrine would not apply to the cases covered
by H.R. 11315, whose touchstone is a concept of "commercial activity" involving signifi-
cant jurisdictional contacts with this country. The conclusions of the committee are in
concurrence with the position of the government in its amicus brief to the Supreme Court
in the Dunhill case where the Solicitor General stated:
[U]nder the modern restrictive theory of sovereign immunity, a foreign state is
not immune from suit on its commercial obligations. To elevate the foreign state's
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It is clear that lower federal courts continue to circumvent the act of
state doctrine as the rationale for its application has shifted from embar-
rassment in the conduct of foreign relations to a proper relationship be-
tween branches of government based upon "'constitutional'
underpinnings."' 0 8 A recent decision denied application of the act of
state doctrine and permitted determination as a factual matter whether
an award of a contract by a foreign government was motivated by alleged
bribery.10 9 The Legal Adviser of the Department of State furnished a
letter to the District Court stating: "If the adjudication of this suit were
to involve a judicial inquiry into the motivations of the Government of
Nigeria's decision to award the contract, the Department does not be-
lieve the act of state doctrine would bar the Court from adjudicating this
dispute."' 10 Although the court discussed the commercial act exception,
it found that the contract in the case was not a commercial act. None-
theless, confusion remains among the lower federal courts as to the
proper application of the act of state doctrine. Whether a further act of
Congress would be helpful in clarifying the role of the doctrine is a ques-
tion members of Congress should consider.
Chapter 5 of Part IV is captioned "Immunity of States From Jurisdic-
tion" and is composed of three subchapters."' This review deals only
with subchapter A, "Immunity of Foreign States from Jurisdiction to
Adjudicate."' 12 Thus, pursuant to the Restatement's categorization of
jurisdiction, adjudication involves a state's subjecting "persons or things
to the process of its courts or administrative tribunals, whether in civil or
in criminal proceedings, whether or not the state is a party to the pro-
ceedings."'"1 3 This categorization of state immunity differs from the
Supreme Court's analysis in Verlinden B. V v. Central Bank of Nige-
ria. 14 There, the Court viewed the FSIA as creating substantive federal
law; other analyses categorize this as a prescribing function, pursuant to
the "arising under" clause of Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution.
commercial acts to the protected status of "acts of state" would frustrate this mod-
em development by permitting sovereign immunity to reenter through the back
door; under the guise of the act of state doctrine. (Amicus Brief of United States,
p. 41.)
108. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 423 (1964).
109. See Environmental Tectonics v. W. S. Kirkpatrick, Inc., 847 F.2d 1052 (3d Cir.
1988).
110. Id. at 1067-69 (text of Legal Adviser's letter is appended to the opinion).
111. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) §§ 451-463.
112. Id. §§ 451-460.
113. Id. § 401(b).




By definition a restatement is designed to reflect the law and not specu-
late as to what might be desirable. The latter is the function of commen-
tators and authors of books and articles. Consistent with the restatement
function, subchapter A reflects the foreign relations law of the United
States in the area of sovereign immunity, including customary interna-
tional law, and more particularly the FSIA. The comments of this au-
thor are not intended to be critical of subchapter A, but rather are
intended to be suggestive for clarification of, and it is hoped, improve-
ment in, the FSIA through statutory amendment.
Although not an easy task, consideration should be given to providing
more guidance as to what constitutes a commercial act or transaction.
The present lack of specificity regarding that meaning has resulted in
U.S. courts differing as to what constitutes a commercial transaction. 51 5
In contrast to the FSIA, the British State Immunity Act of 1978 provides
more definitive guidance to parties and courts as to what is meant by
commercial conduct' 16 and could serve as a departure point for consider-
ation by Congress.
Section 1605(a)(3) of the FSIA represents a halting step in the right
direction. In several respects, however, it falls short of its goal of subject-
ing foreign states to decisions on the merits for violations of interna-
tional-law-protected rights in property. The requirement that the
property present in the United States be "in connection with a commer-
cial activity carried on in the United States by the foreign state" is self-
defeating and in no way related to international law principles concern-
ing unlawful state-taking of alien-owned property. Moreover, this re-
quirement invites abuse by a foreign state since it may readily transfer
the expropriated property to itself in circumstances in which it is not
engaged in commercial activity. Clearly the requirement that the expro-
priated property present in the United States be in connection with a
commercial activity should be eliminated. Section 1330 of the FSIA pro-
vides for in personam jurisdiction over the foreign state. Thus, there is
no rational basis for a requirement that the property be present in any
115. Compare Environmental Tectonics v. W. S. Kirkpatrick, Inc., 847 F.2d 1052 (3d Cir.
1988) with Texas Trading & Milling Corp. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 647 F.2d 300 (2d
Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1148 (1982).
116. British State Immunity Act 1978, Ch. 33, 3 pt. I, 3.3, reprinted in 17 I.L.M. 1123-29
(1978). The Act provides that a commercial transaction includes:
(a) any contract for the supply of goods or services;
(b) any loan or other transaction for the provision of finance and any guarantee or in-
demnity in respect of any such transaction or of any other financial obligation; and
(c) any other transaction or activity (whether of a commercial, industrial, financial, pro-
fessional or other similar character) into which a State enters or in which it engages other-
wise than in the exercise of sovereign authority.
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particular mode-commercial or otherwise. Presence of the property in
the United States should be sufficient.
In regard to foreign takings of U.S. nationals' property, revision of the
FSIA should also spell out the applicable principles of international law
as was done in the Hickenlooper Amendment. 117 A simple cross-refer-
ence to that amendment would serve that purpose. Until there is clarifi-
cation and limitation of the applicability of the act of state doctrine, it
will remain the "Catch-22" of section 1605(a)(3) of the FSIA.118
Section 1610 of the Act, exceptions to the immunity from attachment
or execution, is structured similarly to section 1605, in that it provides a
general rule of immunity followed by exceptions. The most glaring defi-
ciency in this section appears in section 1610(d) which prohibits prejudg-
ment attachments against a foreign state in the absence of an explicit
waiver. Moreover, even in case of such a waiver, the attachment must be
for "the purpose of" securing "satisfaction of a judgment that has been
or may ultimately be entered against the foreign state .... .119 If a pur-
pose of the FSIA was to place private parties and foreign states in a posi-
tion of equality with respect to litigation arising out of commercial
transactions, this denial of prejudgment attachment significantly defeats
that purpose. Foreign states obviously remain unfettered in securing
prejudgment attachment against private parties under the forum's proce-
dural rules. There is no reason to believe that foreign states engaged in
commercial conduct and subject to the FSIA immunity exceptions would
be alarmed or sensitive if strict rules were adopted to authorize conserva-
tory prejudgment attachment where there is a clear threat of removal of
assets so as to frustrate execution of a judgment that might be rendered
in a party's favor. Section 6201 of the New York Civil Practice Law and
Rules could serve as a model.120 These rules are quite strict in that the
party seeking prejudgment attachment must provide evidence that the
claim will probably succeed on the merits and that there are grounds for
117. See Foreign Assistance Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-6333, § 301(d), 78 Stat. 1009
(1964) (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(2) (1982)).
118. See supra notes 106-10 and accompanying text.
119. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 107, at 30.
120. Section 6201 provides:
An order of attachment may be granted in any action, except a matrimonial action, where
the plaintiff has demanded and would be entitled, in whole or in part, or in the alternative,
to a money judgment against one or more defendants, when:
3. the defendant, with intent to defraud his creditors or frustrate the enforcement of a
judgment that might be rendered in plaintiff's favor, has assigned, disposed of, encum-
bered or secreted property or removed it from the state or is about to do any of these acts




the attachment. The Restatement reports that some foreign states have
provided for prejudgment attachment as a conservatory or security mea-
sure.121 Such provisions do not appear to have unduly alarmed other
states.
The recent Supreme Court decision in the case of Argentine Republic v.
Amerada Hess Ship. Corp. 122 illustrates a gap in prescription which a
revision of the FSIA should close. There the Court found that the FSIA
provided the sole basis for securing jurisdiction over a foreign state in
U.S. courts and that the Alien Tort Statute was inapplicable. 123 Plain-
tiff's vessel, while on the high seas and well away from designated areas
of hostilities during the Falkland Islands war, was bombed by Argentine
military aircraft with the result that the vessel was ultimately lost. Plain-
tiffs contended that this action was in violation of international law. The
Court found that the FSIA authorized the only exceptions to immunity
for foreign states, and that section 1605 failed to provide an exception in
the circumstances of plaintiffs' injuries. After more than a decade of ex-
perience with the FSIA, Congress should review its effectiveness in pro-
viding a level playing field for private parties and foreign states engaging
in commercial transactions as well as in cases of state violations of inter-
national law prescriptions. In that review process, Congress should con-
sider providing a further exception to immunity for violations of
international law such as that which occurred in the Amerada Hess case.
Such an exception would be in accord with the Supreme Court's repeated
position that international law forms a part of U.S. law.
124
Conclusion
The Reporters of the Third Restatement are to be commended for the
enormity of the task they undertook in restating the foreign relations law
of the United States in the closing years of the twentieth century. There
is no more complex and changing area of the law. This review of Part IV
suggests both the complexity and changing nature of our foreign rela-
121. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), § 460 reporters' note 1, where there is a discussion of
the following foreign decisions: Decision of April 12, 1983, 64 BVerfGE, reprinted in 22
I.L.M. 1279 (1983) (West German Constitutional Court permitted security attachments in
advance of judgment against state property on claim not entitled to immunity, provided prop-
erty was used for commercial purpose); Trendtex Trading Corp. v. Central Bank of Nigeria,
[1977] Q.B. 529, 561, 579-80 (prejudgment injunctions permitted against transfer of state funds
provided property was used for commercial purposes).
122. 109 S. Ct. 683 (1989).
123. Id. at 689-90.
124. See, e.g., Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 423 (1964); The Pa-
quete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900); Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dal].) 198, 281 (1796); see
also Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 884-87 (2d Cir. 1980).
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tions law in the difficult area of jurisdiction. Although this review takes
issue with some aspects of that Part, these differences in no way detract
from this reviewer's high regard and appreciation for the work of the
Reporters. Difference in analysis and conclusion in no way diminishes
respect for their work.
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